Revenue Recognition Rules for Bundled Sales in High Technology Undermine the Purpose of Section 10(B) of the Securities Exchange Act by Terry, Latasha D.
Revenue Recognition Rules for Bundled
Sales in High Technology Undermine
the Purpose of Section 10(B) of the
Securities and Exchange Act
By LATASHA D. TERRY*
Introduction
THIS COMMENT ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS with the special-
ized revenue recognition rule Statement of Position 97-2 (“SOP 97-
2”)1 and its more recent relatives, Accounting Standards Update 2009-
132 (“ASU 2009-13”) and Accounting Standards Update 2009-143
(“ASU 2009-14”). These rules apply primarily to software companies
but also apply to companies with software products.4 Under these
rules, there are instances in which high technology companies are al-
lowed to recognize all of the revenue from a bundled sale 5 even if a
portion of the expenses for that sale may not be recognized until a
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and the entire Law Review staff at the University of San Francisco School of Law for their
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1. SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION, Statement of Position 97-2 (Am. Inst. of Certi-
fied Pub. Accountants, Inc. 1997).
2. REVENUE RECOGNITION (TOPIC 605): MULTIPLE-DELIVERABLE REVENUE ARRANGE-
MENTS, Accounting Standards Update No. 2009-13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
3. SOFTWARE (TOPIC 985): CERTAIN REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS THAT INCLUDE SOFTWARE
ELEMENTS, Accounting Standards Update No. 2009-14 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2009) [hereinafter CERTAIN REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS].
4. Frederick W. Round, Tax Implications of Changes in Software Revenue Recognition
Rules, J. INT’L TAX’N, Dec. 9, 1998, at 24, 26; Debrief on ASU 2009-14 (EITF 09-03): Seismic
Shift in SOP 97-2, REVENUE RECOGNITION, at 1, http://revenuerecognition.web13.hubspot
.com/Portals/219512/docs/EITF09-3.pdf, at 1 (last visited Apr. 23, 2014) [hereinafter De-
brief on ASU 2009-14] (“[T]hese hardware/software combinations . . . [are] now controlled
by ASU 2009-13 . . . .”); id. at 2 (“[ASU 2009-14] will simply ‘move’ certain arrangements
from the SOP 97-2 into the ASU 2009-13 . . . accounting camp . . . .”).
5. See infra Part III.A.3.
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future period.6 This is a break from more traditional accounting prin-
ciples, which require revenues and accompanying expenses to be rec-
ognized in the same period.7 This recognition mismatch—the
discrepancy in timing between when revenue for the transaction is
reported and when expenses for the transaction are incurred—allows
high technology companies to report inflated revenue, which does
not accurately depict the company’s true earnings.8 Such misre-
porting misleads investors because it may encourage them to invest in
a company they may not otherwise deem investment worthy.9
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (“Act”),10 which created the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”)11 whose mission is to protect investors.12 Through the
Act, Congress empowered the SEC with broad authority over all as-
pects of the securities industry.13 “This includes the power to register,
regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing
agencies as well as the nation’s securities self regulatory [sic] organiza-
tions” (“SROs”).14 The various securities exchanges, such as the New
York Stock Exchange (“NSYE”), NASDAQ Stock Market, Chicago
Board Options Exchange, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority are examples of SROs.15 These SROs are non-governmental
but they have the power to create and enforce fair and ethical industry
standards.16
6. See Douglas R. Carmichael, Software Revenue Recognition Under SOP 97-2, CPA J., July
1998, at 44, 48, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1998/0798/features/
f440798.htm (“SOP 97-2 effectively substitutes evaluation of multiple elements for assess-
ment of the significance of remaining vendor obligations.”); Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra
note 4, at 1 (“With these hardware/software combinations . . . now controlled by ASU
2009-13[,] . . . companies should be able to . . . recognize revenue sooner [than they could
under SOP 97-2].”).
7. ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 6, ¶ 145 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985) (“The goal of accrual accounting is to
account in the periods in which [revenues, expenses, gains, losses] occur for the effects on
an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances, to the extent that those fi-
nancial effects are recognizable and realizable.”)
8. See infra Part III.A.3.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
11. Id. § 11.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo
.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate].
15. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-2(c) (2012).
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The SEC regulates publicly-held companies by requiring them to
disclose “meaningful financial” and other information to the public.17
The purpose of the SEC is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly,
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”18 The SEC
website states: “As more and more first-time investors turn to the mar-
kets to help secure their futures, pay for homes, and send children to
college, our investor protection mission is more compelling than
ever.”19 Yet, SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 compromise
investor protection by allowing a discrepancy between revenue as re-
ported and revenue as earned.
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews revenue recognition meth-
odology under traditional accounting principles. Business and eco-
nomic activities are surrounded by uncertainty. Therefore, traditional
accounting principles historically follow the conservative doctrine, 20
which provides that uncertainties in revenue recognition are ac-
counted for in the direction of understatement rather than overstate-
ment.21 Part I also briefly reviews the role of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”) and the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”).
Part II introduces FASB’s rule, SOP 97-2, and describes when,
how, and by whom SOP 97-2 can be used. This Part also introduces
FASB’s newer rules, ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14.
Part III addresses the problems that SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and
ASU 2009-14 pose. Specifically, this part examines the effects on a
company’s shares and the increase in the number of financial restate-
ments after these rules were implemented. Also, this part explores the
dilemma of whether software in tangible products like a mobile smart
phone should be covered by ASU 2009-13 or SOP 97-2.
Part IV examines the role of section 10(b) of the Act.22 Section
10(b) of the Act is meant to protect investors by preventing fraud23
and authorizes the SEC to regulate the use of “manipulative and de-
ceptive devices.”24 This part argues that such devices may include fi-
nancial statements.
17. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Infra, Part I.A.
21. See infra, Part I.A.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
23. Id.
24. Steve Thel, The Original Conceptions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 388 (1990); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S.
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Part V addresses exactly how and why SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13,
and ASU 2009-14 undermine the purposes of section 10(b) by show-
ing how they provide loopholes, which allow certain software compa-
nies to defraud investors. It also summarizes the implications of these
rules.
Part VI recommends the adoption of a defer-all rule, in which
companies must defer revenue for the entire transaction if revenue
for one of the elements of the bundle has not been earned. In the
alternative, the FASB should adopt a three-period rule, in which
software companies must wait three quarterly periods before they can
recognize revenue from bundled transactions if the income for one or
more of the elements had not been earned. These recommendations
would help strengthen securities regulation and protect the public.
I. Foundations of Revenue Recognition
Accounting practices are governed by the GAAP, which are devel-
oped by FASB, a seven-member independent board consisting of ac-
counting professionals.25 The FASB, under the auspices of the SEC,
authorizes and makes the accounting rules for firms doing business in
the U.S.26 As such, GAAP is recognized as authoritative by the SEC
and aims to improve the quality and transparency of accounting and
financial-reporting standards and the standard setting process.27
There are two levels of GAAP: authoritative and non-authorita-
tive.28 The FASB Accounting Standards Codification (the “Codifica-
tion”) is the source of authoritative U.S. GAAP applicable to
148, 156–57 (2008) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5: Employment of manipulative and de-
ceptive devices) (“The SEC, pursuant to [section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act],
promulgated Rule 10b–5, which makes it unlawful . . . ‘[t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’”).
25. See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Desig-
nated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47,743, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,028, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr.
25, 2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm [hereinafter Com-
mission Statement of Policy].
26. Id.
27. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.6(1)(A)
(2014).
28. See TOPIC 105—GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, Accounting Stan-
dards Update No. 2009-01, at 2 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009), available at http://
www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156316498 (follow “Update No.
2009–01” hyperlink; then follow “Accept” hyperlink) [hereinafter Accounting Standards
Update No. 2009-01].
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nongovernmental entities.29 “Rules and interpretive releases of the
SEC under federal securities laws are also sources of authoritative
GAAP for SEC registrants.”30 Additionally, “SEC staff issues Staff Ac-
counting Bulletins that represent practices followed by the staff in ad-
ministering SEC disclosure requirements, and it utilizes SEC Staff
Announcements and Observer comments made at Emerging Issues
Task Force meetings to publicly announce its views on certain ac-
counting issues for SEC registrants.”31 Accounting and financial re-
porting practices are considered non-authoritative unless included in
the Codification.32 The FASB may ratify or grandfather pre-codifica-
tion standards—even if set forth by non-authoritative figures—into
the Codification.33 All guidance and standards set forth in the Codifi-
cation carry an equal level of authority.34
The Codification instructs entities to first consider the account-
ing principles in a source of authoritative GAAP (i.e. the Codification)
for financial reporting guidance with respect to a specific transaction
or event.35 If an event is not specified within a source of authoritative
GAAP, then the entity should consider a source of authoritative GAAP
that guides similar transactions and events. Finally, unless prohibited
from doing so, the entity will consider non-authoritative GAAP from
other sources.36 Sources of non-authoritative GAAP include, but are
not limited to, sources that are widely recognized and prevalent in the
industry such as FASB Concept Statements, American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants (“AICPA”)37 Issues Papers, and Interna-
29. Id. at 6 (defining a nongovernmental entity as “[an] entity that is not required to
issue financial reports in accordance with guidance promulgated by the Governmental Ac-
counting Standards Board or the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board”).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6–7.
32. Id. at 18.
33. See e.g., Matthew G. Lamoreaux, FASB Allows Early Adoption of Key Provisions of New
Revenue Recognition Approach, J. ACCT. (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.journalofaccountancy
.com/Web/20092185.htm. FASB ratified AICPA’s SOP 97-2; thus, SOP 97-2 is considered
an authoritative source of accounting guidance even though AICPA, a non-authoritative
entity, created it. FASB Enacts Significant Changes in Revenue Recognition Guidance, CBIZ
TOFIAS, http://www.cbiz.com/tofias/page.asp?pid=8371 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
34. See Accounting Standards Update No. 2009-01, supra note 28, at 6.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 7.
37. The AICPA is a member association that represents accountants. It sets non-au-
thoritative and ethical standards for the accounting profession and sets U.S. auditing stan-
dards for the auditing of private companies; nonprofit organizations; and federal, state,
and local governments. It develops and grades the Uniform CPA Examination and offers
specialty credentials for CPAs that concentrate on personal financial planning, fraud and
590 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
tional Financial Reporting Standards of the International Accounting
Standards Board.38
A. Traditional Revenue Recognition Policy
Early investors, managers, and accountants developed a conserva-
tive culture around recognizing revenue in financial reporting.39 Con-
servatism is a doctrine in financial reporting dictating that “possible
errors in measurement [are accounted] in the direction of under-
statement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets.”40
One of the principles guiding conservative financial reporting is
called the matching principle, which states that expenses must be
matched with the revenue that produced that expense.41 This means
that companies offering products with multiple deliverables cannot
recognize all of their revenue in one period. Instead these companies
are required to defer revenue on some of those products to a future
period in the event future expenses arise.42
• Multiple Deliverables:
• Android (sold today = current 
expense)
• Repair warranty (future 
expense)
• Upgrade (future expense)
Android revenue & expense 
recognized today
Date: 11/15/2012
• Upgrade given on 2/15/2013
Upgrade revenue & 
expense recognized on 
Date: 2/15/2013 • Repair service provided on 
5/15/2013
Repair revenue expense 
recognized on 
Date: 05/15/2013
forensics, business valuation, and information technology. About the AICPA, AM. INST. OF
CPAS, http://www.aicpa.org/About/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 16 2014).
38. See id.
39. See QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Concepts No. 2, ¶ 91 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002).
40. Id.
41. Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 F.2d 656, 657 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing 26 I.R.C.
§§ 446, 471 (1954)).
42. Id.
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B. Why SOP 97-2? History of Efforts to Standardize Revenue
Recognition Practices
In the early 1980s, before the adoption of specific revenue recog-
nition guidelines for the software industry, software companies dif-
fered in their revenue recognition approaches.43 Some used very
conservative practices—recognizing revenue upon delivery of the
item. Others used “decidedly aggressive” practices—recognizing reve-
nue after the customer signed a purchase contract.44 During the early
1980s, since GAAP did not address revenue recognition by software
companies, firms relied on industry practice.45
The problem was that there were no consistent revenue recogni-
tion practices in the software industry.46 Lack of consistency or “diver-
sity in practice” encouraged abuse or inaccuracy in financial
reporting.47 Financial reporting abuse may include misreporting by
understating costs or overstating revenue.48 Such abuse can negatively
affect investors who rely on financial reporting to create an accurate
portrayal of a company’s financial health. Thus, FASB tried to make
accounting practices, by industry, as consistent as practicable. In 1982,
a survey conducted by a computer services trade organization revealed
that about 15 percent of large software companies identified contract
signing as the critical event that justified recognizing revenue because
that was the point when the customer became obligated to license the
software rather than when the customer actually received the prod-
uct.49 In 1987, the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Commit-
tee (“ASE Committee”) unanimously determined that delivery of
software (not contract signing) was the critical event for revenue rec-
ognition purposes since the legal signing of a contract was worth noth-
ing without the actual ability to use the software.50
II. Revenue Recogntion Policies Try to Catch Up with Tech
Largely as an effort to halt the software industry’s financial re-
porting abuses  and to clarify the applicable rules, AICPA created SOP
43. Carmichael, supra note 6, at 45.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. HAZEN, supra note 27, § 9.6(1)(C).
49. Carmichael, supra note 6, at 45.
50. Id.
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97-2.51 Despite the efforts to clarify revenue recognition, there can be
confusion as to whom SOP 97-2 applies, how it is utilized, and when
revenue can be recognized under the rule.52 However, more recent
rules that apply to companies with “tangible products containing
software and non-software components that function together to de-
liver the product’s essential functionality”53—ASU 2009-13 and ASU
2009-14—make matters worse by relaxing SOP 97-2’s requirement
that a vendor determine the fair value of software items by using Ven-
dor-Specific Objective Evidence54 (“VSOE”) for undelivered elements
of a bundled transaction.
A. Development of SOP 97-2
Literature released by AICPA is not an authoritative source of ac-
counting guidance.55 But its contributions provide technical support,
standard setting, and guidelines in conjunction with the FASB. 56 Un-
less the SEC directs otherwise, all companies registered with the SEC
must comply with the accounting standards set by FASB.57
Prior to the development of SOP 97-2, SOP 91-1 was the authority
on revenue recognition. SOP 91-1 applied the same revenue recogni-
tion criteria to both non-software and software products.58 But this
proved difficult for software transactions that bundled a complex mix
of products and services with a single fee for bundled transactions.59
Such difficulty is the rationale behind FASB’s break from conservative
accounting practices via SOP 97-2.60
51. See id.
52. See infra Parts II.B.1–3.
53. See infra Part II.C.
54. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing VSOE).
55. See Commission Statement of Policy, supra note 25.
56. Frequently Asked Questions About the AICPA, AM. INST. OF CPAS, http://www.aicpa
.org/About/FAQs/Pages/FAQs.aspx#aicpa_answer11 (last visited Mar. 16 2014) (address-
ing what the relationship is between AICPA and FASB).
57. Id.
58. SOP 91-1 determined that the same basic criteria for revenue recognition that
applied to non-software products should also apply to software products. It also adopted
the same underlying criteria for delivery and collectability for software products as was
applied to non-software products. SOP 91-1, however, did not clearly define the new stan-
dard, which caused financial reporting abuses to persist. Consequently, FASB created SOP
97-2 to define the standard in greater detail and add industry-relevant details. Carmichael,
supra note 6, at 45.
59. Id.
60. Note that SOP 97-2 only applies in narrow circumstances. See infra Part II.B.
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In October 1997, AICPA’s ASE Committee created SOP 97-2,
Software Revenue Recognition, as a replacement for SOP 91-1.61 SOP
97-2 governed “software products that are essential to the function of
any non-software product.”62 However, in October 2009, ASU 2009-14
removed certain products from the scope of SOP 97-2.63 This will be
discussed in more detail later.64
SOP 97-2 requires revenue to be “recognized in accordance with
contract accounting65 when the arrangement requires significant pro-
duction, modification, or customization of software.”66 However,
when the transaction does not require significant modification of the
software, a company may recognize the revenue of all elements of a
bundled transaction (both software and non-software elements) if
there is evidence of an agreement, delivery has occurred, the vendor’s
price is fixed or determinable, and collectability is probable.67 SOP
97-2 serves as a narrow exception to the more traditional matching
principle and is a break from conservative financial reporting because
it allows software companies to recognize revenue before they recog-
nize the expense for that revenue.
61. See Carmichael, supra note 6, at 45.
62. Steven T. Petra & Nathan S. Slavin, Revenue Recognition for Software Products with
Multiple Deliverables, CPA J., Apr. 2005, at 38, 38, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2005/405/essentials/p38.htm.
63. See infra Part II.C.
64. See infra Part II.C.
65. Contract accounting is “[a] method of reporting profit or loss on certain long-
term contracts by recognizing gross income and expenses in the tax year that the contract
is completed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (9th ed. 2009).
66. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38; DELOITTE, SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION: A
ROADMAP TO APPLYING ASC 985-605, at 25 (2011) (“If an arrangement contains software as
well as services that involve significant production, modification, or customization of the
software, the services cannot be separately recognized from the software. In such cases, a
vendor should apply contract accounting . . . to the entire arrangement.”) [hereinafter A
ROADMAP TO APPLYING ASC 985-605].
67. GRANT THORNTON, REVENUE RECOGNITION: A GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THROUGH THE
MAZE 88 (2010), available at http://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-files/
technology/pdfs/TIP-revenue-recognition-tips-for-tech-companies.ashx [hereinafter NAVI-
GATING THROUGH THE MAZE]; A ROADMAP TO APPLYING ASC 985-605, supra note 69, at 40.
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SOP 97-2 MODEL:
Android phone
Expense $3.4 billion
Revenue 10.5 billion
Date: 2/19/2009
Upgrade/Warranty
Expense: $2.5 billion
Revenue: $5.1 billion
Date: Future
BUNDLE:
Android & Upgrade
Total Expense: $5.9 billion
Revenue:$15.6 billion
Date: 2/19/2009
B. Breadth and Scope of SOP 97-2
Some issues that have accompanied SOP 97-2 are related to its
breadth and scope.68 For example, it is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine who can use SOP 97-2, when it can be used, and how it can be
used. When the rule was first developed it appeared it would only af-
fect software companies, companies with high tech products, or com-
panies with a specific purpose of developing software.69 The policy
failed to anticipate the magnitude and influence of software and high
technology on non-software products and services.70 Thus, as we en-
tered a new millennium, more and more companies found it neces-
sary to evaluate their products and services to determine whether or
not they fell under SOP 97-2.71
Understanding the proper breadth and scope of SOP 97-2 is im-
portant because of the relative advantages and disadvantages compa-
nies have depending on whether it applies. Use of SOP 97-2 provides
an advantage because companies can artificially inflate profits on their
financial statements by recognizing all revenue upfront even if only
68. See Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 39.
69. See Greg Regan & Tim Regan, Software Revenue Recognition on the Rise, J. ACCT., Dec.
2007, at 50, 50 (“When Statement of Position 97-2 . . . was issued in October 1997, it was
clear that all software companies would transition to this new standard.”).
70. See id. (“When Statement of Position 97-2 . . . was issued in October 1997 . . . . it
was not clear how bright lines would blur for companies outside of the traditional software
sector as technology evolved over the next decade.”).
71. Id. (discussing how a range of different companies must comply with, or consider,
software revenue recognition rules as these companies increasingly rely on software
technology).
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part of the revenue from the bundle has been earned (i.e., costs for
the transaction have not been incurred).72 Companies who must use
traditional revenue recognition rules are at a disadvantage because
they must defer the recognition of revenue until all of the revenue is
earned (i.e., all costs have been incurred for the transaction), making
their financial statements appear weaker than companies that fall
under SOP 97-2.
1. Who Can Use SOP 97-2?
A company must use SOP 97-2 if they license, sell, lease, host,73 or
market computer software.74 “[S]oftware and software-related ele-
ments75 of arrangements that include software that is more-than-inci-
dental to the products or services in the arrangement as a whole” fall
within SOP 97-2.76 To be clear, a service is covered by SOP 97-2 if
software in the arrangement is essential to the functionality of that
service.77 An exception applies for tangible products containing both
software and non-software components that function together to de-
liver the product’s essential functionality.78 In such cases ASU 2009-13
and ASU 2009-14 will govern the transaction.79 But where the software
is merely incidental to the function of the tangible product, SOP 97-2
applies.80
To determine when SOP 97-2 applies, it helps to understand
when ASU 2009-13 applies. In 2003, FASB created Emerging Issues
Task Force81 Issue 00-21 (“EITF 00-21”)82 to govern multiple- delivera-
72. See infra Part III.A.3.
73. SOP 97-2 only applies to hosting arrangements that give the customer the option
to take possession of the software. In a typical hosting arrangement, a customer does not
possess the software, but can access or use it on an as-needed basis over the Internet or
through some other connection. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38.
74. Id.
75. “Software-related elements include software products and services . . . .” CERTAIN
REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 3, ¶ 2(c).
76. Id. (struck-through material omitted).
77. Id.
78. See Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 1.
79. Id.
80. See RALPH NEFDT & RYAN DILLARD, GRANT THORTON, DO YOUR PRODUCTS FALL
UNDER SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION GUIDANCE? 3 (2011), http://revenuerecognition
.web13.hubspot.com/Portals/219512/docs/RevRecGuidance.pdf (“Some arrangements
include . . . nonessential software deliverables that are within the scope of [SOP 97-2].”);
NAVIGATING THROUGH THE MAZE, supra note 70, at 61 (“Because the measurement software
is essential to the device’s functionality, the measurement software and the device and the
related training are excluded from the scope of ASC 985-605.”).
81. “The Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) was formed in 1984 . . . . to assist the
FASB in improving financial reporting through the timely identification, discussion, and
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ble products that include software incidental (but not essential) to the
products and services as a whole.83 ASU 2009-13 replaced EITF 00-21
in October of 2009 and now governs “tangible products containing
software components and non-software components that function to-
gether to deliver the product’s essential functionality.”84
Now, in a bundled transaction software is essential to the function
of a tangible product depending on an analysis of the following five
factors set forth in ASU 2009-14: (1) “If sales of the tangible product
without the software elements are infrequent, a rebuttable presump-
tion exists that software elements are essential to the functionality of
the tangible product;”85 (2) If similar products are only differentiated
by whether the products contains the software, they are considered
the same product under factor (1);86 (3) Software can also be sold
standalone, but the separate sale of a software product shall not cause
a presumption that the software is not essential to the tangible prod-
uct’s functionality87; (4) Software elements are not necessarily re-
quired to be embedded in the tangible product to be considered
essential;88 and (5) Non-software elements must substantively contrib-
ute to the product’s functionality and may not merely be a mechanism
to deliver the software to the customer.89
Consider the Microsoft Corporation, which typically sells both the
Windows Operating System (e.g., “Windows 8.1”) software and the
Microsoft Office software (“Microsoft Office”) with its computer sys-
tems. Windows 8.1 would be considered essential to the computer sys-
tem’s functionality while Microsoft Office would be considered merely
incidental. This is because (1) Microsoft infrequently, if ever, sells com-
puter systems without Windows 8.1. However, they frequently sell
Microsoft Office without a computer system. (2) Since this factor per-
tains to tangible products referenced in factor (1), this factor does not
resolution of financial accounting issues within the framework of the . . . [Codifica-
tion] . . . .” Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF): About the EITF, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137512, (last visited
Mar. 16, 2014) [hereinafter About the EITF].
82. REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MULTIPLE DELIVERABLES, Emerging Issues Task
Force Issue No. 00-21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003).
83. See Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38; About the EITF, supra note 84.
84. CERTAIN REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 3.
85. Id. ¶ 4(a).
86. Id. ¶ 4(b).
87. Id. ¶ 4(c).
88. Id. ¶ 4(d).
89. Id. ¶ 4(e).
Winter 2014] REVENUE RECOGNITION RULES 597
apply.90 (3) Windows 8.1 is unlikely to be sold standalone since it is
useless without an accompanying computer system. However,
Microsoft Office can be sold standalone since the software can be
used in different lines of computers not just computers sold by
Microsoft. (4) Windows 8.1 is required to be embedded or preloaded
on all new computers in order for the computer to function. How-
ever, Microsoft Office does not need to be embedded in a computer.
(5) The hardware elements of a computer substantively contribute to
the functionality of both Windows 8.1 and Microsoft Office.
Thus, when applying ASU 2009-14’s five factors, Windows 8.1
would likely be deemed essential to the computer’s functionality while
Microsoft Office would likely be deemed incidental to the computer’s
functionality. Therefore, ASU 2009-14 would govern the sale of the
Windows 8.1 software while SOP 97-2 would govern the sale of
Microsoft Office. Note that SOP 97-2 governs the sale of Microsoft
Office when it is bundled with a tangible product and is not essential
to the product’s functionality.91 If the Microsoft Office software were
bundled with other software products (e.g., software upgrades) then
the bundled transaction would be purely software and also subject to
SOP 97-2.
2. How Should SOP 97-2 Be Used?
Under SOP 97-2, a vendor must determine the fair value of
software items by using Vendor-Specific Objective Evidence
(“VSOE”),92 which “is limited to the price charged by the vendor for
each element when it is sold separately.”93 VSOE is equated with the
fair market value of an individual element of a bundle in a transac-
tion.94 Therefore, to recognize all of the revenue from a multiple-de-
liverable sale, a company must be able to give the fair market value for
each deliverable.95 The two standards that companies can use to mea-
90. See id. ¶ 4(b) (“If the only significant difference between similar products is that
one product includes software that the other product does not, the products shall be con-
sidered the same product for the purpose of evaluating [the first factor].”).
91. Nefdt & Dillard, supra note 83, at 3 (“Some arrangements include software deliver-
ables that are essential to the [tangible] product’s functionality that are within the scope of
[ASU 2009-13], along with nonessential software deliverables that are within the scope of
[SOP 97-2].”).
92. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38 (“If contract accounting is not required, SOP
97-2 requires that the vendor’s fee be allocated to the various elements based on vendor-
specific objective evidence . . . of each element.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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sure whether they may provide stand-alone value for each of their de-
liverables are (1) separate sales data for software products, and (2)
competitors’ prices for non-software data.96
If a vendor has not determined VSOE for each element in the
bundle then it must defer revenue for that bundle until either VSOE
is determined for each element in the bundle or all elements have
been delivered.97
However, if the item is a “non-software” item that does not fall
under ASU 2009-13 or ASU 2009-14 then a company does not have to
use VSOE to determine its fair value. Instead, the company can deter-
mine the item’s fair value based on a competitor’s prices for similar
products and services, also known as third-party evidence (“TPE”). 98
3. When Should Revenue Be Recognized Under SOP 97-2?
Once a company or firm determines that it can recognize its reve-
nue in accordance with SOP 97-2 (versus in accordance with contract
accounting) the company will at some point need to determine when
it is acceptable to recognize revenue from its multiple-deliverable
transactions. Bundling can make it difficult to determine the proper
time to book a sale and a company-related expense. Typically revenue
is recognized when goods are delivered or when services are per-
formed.99 However, these principles aren’t easily applied in the high-
tech sector where principal elements (e.g., cell phones) are typically
bundled with supporting elements (e.g., upgrades, warranties, and
other services).100 The FASB guidelines suggest that if there is persua-
sive evidence that an agreement exists, delivery occurred, the vendor’s
price is fixed or determinable, and collectability is probable,101 then a
firm can safely recognize revenue from a bundled transaction.102
96. Regan & Regan, supra note 72, at 53.
97. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id. at 38.
100. See id. at 39.
101. The term “‘[p]robable’ means ‘more likely than not’ under [International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards], but means ‘likely to occur’ under U.S. GAAP, as defined in
FASB Accounting Standards Codification Topic 450, Contingencies.” Ken Tysiac, Collectability
Threshold Added in Significant Change to Rev Rec Proposal, J. ACCT. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://
www.journalofaccountancy.com/News/20139012.htm.
102. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38; A ROADMAP TO APPLYING ASC 985-605, supra
note 69, at 25.
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C. ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 Alter the Landscape
In 2009, the FASB released ASU 2009-13 (formerly EITF 08-01103)
and ASU 2009-14 (formerly EITF 09-03104). ASU 2009-14 removed cer-
tain products from the scope of SOP 97-2, specifically, “tangible prod-
ucts containing software components and non-software components
that function together to deliver the product’s essential functional-
ity.”105 The new rules give companies significant discretion to “deter-
mine the fair value of the undelivered portion of the ongoing
obligation and [are] required only to defer revenue recognition on
the undelivered portion of the sale.”106 Both ASU 2009-13 and ASU
2009-14 make revenue easier to recognize than under even SOP 97-2
because they eliminate the requirement for VSOE and permit use of
the estimated selling price (“ESP”) of the undelivered portion if fair
value evidence is unavailable.107 ESP is a more flexible standard than
third-party evidence108 (“TPE”) or VSOE.109 ESP can potentially be
applied to undelivered elements in an arrangement (permitting sepa-
ration and acceleration of revenue recognition for items deliv-
ered).110 Finally, ESP allows pricing and discounting policies to be
more flexible and more competitive than the rigid requirements of
VSOE under SOP 97-2.111 The following figure112 illustrates the rank
of various measures:
103. Jim McGleever, Getting Your Finance Processes in Shape for FASB’s New Revenue Recog-
nition Rules, NETSUITE, http://www.netsuite.com/portal/resource/articles/eitf-08-01-best-
practices-for-adoption.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (“EITF 08-01 . . . supersede[d]
EITF 00-21, which previously set forth the requirements that must be met for a company to
recognize revenue from the sale of a delivered item that is a part of a multiple-element
arrangement when other items have not yet been delivered.”).
104. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 1.
105. Id.
106. See City of Royal Oak Ret. Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1045,
1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
107. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 1.
108. Third-party evidence of selling price is “the price of the vendor’s or any competi-
tor’s largely interchangeable products or services in a standalone sales to similarly situated
customers.” Richard A. Cleaveland, Revenue Recognition (Topic 605) Multiple-Deliverable Ar-
rangements A Consensus of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force, EISNER AMPER (June 21, 2010),
http://www.eisneramper.com/Revenue-Recognition-0610.aspx.
109. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 3.
110. Id. at 2 (“Since the lack of such evidence for undelivered items often prevents
companies from recognizing revenue from undelivered elements, the use of estimated
prices instead may permit many more elements to be recognized and potentially accelerat-
ing revenue recognition for delivered items.”).
111. Id.
112. McGleever, supra note 106.
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VSOE
ESP
(Introduced in EITF 08-1)
TPE
The Revenue Recognition Hierarchy
III. Problems with SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14
SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 are ambiguous rules
that are particularly problematic when applied to bundled prod-
ucts.113 Violations of these rules lead to inaccurate financial reporting,
which misleads investors.114 Immediately after SOP 97-2 was passed,
many software companies began misreporting their earnings, which
resulted in their having to later restate their earnings.115 Increases in
restatements also followed the release of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-
14.116
The releases of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 only exacerbated
the problems presented by SOP 97-2 for the potential to mislead
investors.
A. Bundled Products and Ambiguous Rules
When AICPA issued SOP 97-2 in 1997, the ASE committee
adopted the requirement that revenue be fixed or determinable.117
The ASE committee determined that the nature of software arrange-
ments caused a need for persuasive evidence of an arrangement,
which is not the norm in all product sales.118
The ASE committee’s rationale for creating SOP 97-2 was to pre-
vent practice abuses by providing “much more detailed and specific
113. Infra Part III.A.1.
114. See infra Part III.B.
115. See infra Part III.C.
116. Infra Part III.C.
117. Carmichael, supra note 6, at 45.
118. Id.
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guidance on how to account for multiple-element arrangements.”119
Initially, the SEC and AICPA subjected software companies to the
same revenue recognition policies as companies that manufacture
other products.120 However, “[these policies] proved difficult to apply
to software arrangements involving complex mixes of products and
services both specified and unspecified with a single fee for the bun-
dled products and services.”121 The issue of recognizing revenue and
expenses in different periods does not arise with the single sale of
software products. For example, when a customer buys a computer at
Best Buy, upon checkout the customer takes the computer home and
Best Buy collects the customer’s money. At the checkout point, Best
Buy has already incurred the costs of the computer so the product’s
expense and revenue will be recognized in the same period. The same
is true when a software company sells a service, such as a product re-
pair warranty. The revenue for this service cannot be recognized until
the company delivers the service.
1. Bundled Transactions Are the Root of the Problem
The main problem arises when a software company combines
multiple elements, such as the computer and the software license, and
sells them at the same time. This is called a bundled or multiple-ele-
ment sale.122 The key issue here is discerning exactly when a software
company should be allowed to recognize the revenue of its non-
software deliverables. It is unclear whether the non-software deliver-
ables fall under the scope of SOP 97-2 when they are bundled with the
sale of software deliverables.123 “Under SOP 97-2, VSOE of fair value
must be established for the non-software deliverables to avoid defer-
ring revenue recognition.”124 A software company must defer its reve-
nue if it cannot establish VSOE of fair value for non-software
deliverables that have not been delivered.125
While companies that fall within SOP 97-2 must at least deter-
mine VSOE for deliverables that have not been delivered, companies
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id.; Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38 (“Multiple element arrangements are
not limited to the software industry. Other common examples include the sale of com-
puter networks, specialized equipment with installation and training, and cellular tele-
phones with service contracts.”).
123. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 39.
124. Id.
125. Id.; Carmichael, supra note 6, at 50.
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that are beyond the scope of SOP 97-2 and covered by ASU 2009-13
and ASU 2009-14 can avoid VSOE, altogether. They may look to ESP if
fair value evidence is unavailable.126 ESP is a more flexible standard
than both TPE and VSOE.127 may, in some instances be applied to
undelivered elements in a bundle, which permits separation and ac-
celeration of revenue recognition for items delivered.128 Finally, ESP
allows pricing and discounting policies to be more flexible and more
competitive than the rigid requirements of VSOE under SOP 97-2.129
2. In a Tangible Product the Line Between Essential and
Nonessential Is Blurry
One problem is that a very blurry line exists between what is con-
sidered software in a tangible product that is essential versus non-es-
sential to the product’s functionality.130 Thus, “[m]any high-tech
companies struggle with determining whether their tangible products
should be accounted for as a basic multiple-element arrangement as
opposed to being accounted for under the software revenue recogni-
tion rules.”131 Although ASU 2009-14 sets forth the “essential to” the
functionality requirement, determining which rules apply is not
easy.132 For example, should software in a mobile smart phone be con-
sidered essential or nonessential to the functionality of the product?
One may argue that it is non-essential to the functionality since a per-
son could still make phone calls on a mobile smart phone without the
particular vendor’s software. However, the software it holds arguably is
essential to its function since most people purchase mobile smart
phones for the games, applications, Internet browser, and other ad-
vanced features offered and not to simply make phone calls in the way
that a landline phone is used. The lack of clarity surrounding SOP 97-
126. See Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 2 (“[ASU 2009-14] eliminates the re-
quirement for objective and reliable evidence of fair value in order to separate accounting
units, permitting instead the use of estimated ‘selling prices’ for undelivered item [sic] if
Fair Value evidence was unavailable.”).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Nefdt & Dillard, supra note 83, at 3 (“Many high-tech companies struggle with
determining whether their tangible products should be accounted for as a basic multiple-
element arrangement as opposed to being accounted for under the software revenue rec-
ognition rules.”).
131. Id.
132. See id. (“Determining whether software in a tangible product is essential to its
functionality requires management to exercise its judgment.”).
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2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 may cause companies to fall out of
compliance with GAAP.133
3. Equivocal Rules Provide a Clear Path to Violations
The confusing nature of SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-
14 gives software companies an easy excuse for violating the rules by
misapplying them. Software companies that improperly apply the
rules, whether intentionally or not, can avoid deferring their revenue
to a future period. By recognizing the revenue from undelivered ele-
ments of a bundled sale too early, such companies overstate their cur-
rent earnings and make their financial statements look healthier than
they actually are.134 In this way, the intentional misapplication of reve-
nue recognition rules functions to deceive and defraud investors and
conflicts with the purposes of the Act.135 This problem is not unique
to ill-intentioned software companies because the very existence of
these rules allows software companies to legally overstate their earn-
ings. Admittedly, software companies are different in that they may
offer a complex mix of software and non-software products which are
so interconnected that it may be difficult to determine differing
points of sale and delivery.136 However, these difficulties do not justify
the earnings overstatements allowed by SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and
133. See Regan & Regan, supra note 72, at 51 (highlighting the example of NEC Corp.,
a company that was unable to adhere to SOP 97-2 requirements and was delisted from
NASDAQ as a result) (“If companies are . . . unable to complete the requisite [SOP 97-2]
analysis, they may be unable to prepare financial statements in accordance with GAAP.”);
Revenue Recognition: Hope to Cope with the New Standards, REVENUE RECOGNITION, http://www
.revenuerecognition.com/content/articles/9049/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (“[FASB
Chairman] Seidman, apparently acknowledging the potential for confusion in the upcom-
ing standard shift [to the use of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14], said that the FASB
planned on making a roadshow of this comment period, reaching out to key sectors via
workshops . . . . ‘But there will be abuses [of the new standards]. Human nature never
changes.’”).
134. See e.g., Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 256–58 (5th Cir. 2005) (inves-
tor-plaintiffs arguing that defendant’s supposedly strong financial statements were the re-
sult of recognizing revenue on sales of its software products in violation of U.S. GAAP and
AICPA’s SOP 97-2); City of Royal Oak Ret. Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that defendant provided sufficient disclosures to
investors when defendant stated that “[a]s a result of the adoption of ASU 2009-13 and
ASU 2009-14, net revenues for the three and six months ended in June 20, 2010, were
approximately $53 million and $78 million higher than the net revenues that would have
been recorded under the previous accounting rules”).
135. See infra Part V.
136. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38 (“The amount and timing of revenue recogni-
tion is complicated, however, by multiple-element arrangements that provide for multiple
software deliverables [e.g., software products, upgrades or enhancements, postcontract
customer support (PCS), or other services]. In hosting arrangements that are within the
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ASU 2009-14. Software companies should not mislead investors just
because they do not want to carry the extra burden of having to defer
revenue until they deliver their products.
4. ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 Allow Companies to Recognize
Revenue Faster than Under Traditional Rules and
SOP 97-2
The narrowing of SOP 97-2’s scope did not solve the problems
identified in this Comment and actually broadened the scope of the
problems discussed. Recall that both ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14
eliminate the requirement for VSOE and permit use of the more flexi-
ble estimated selling price (“ESP”) if fair value evidence is unavaila-
ble.137 ESP can potentially be applied to undelivered elements in an
arrangement, consequently permitting the acceleration of revenue
recognition for items delivered.138
This problem is more specifically set forth in the Royal Oak139 case
where the plaintiff investors accused the defendants of section 10(b)
violations because of their insufficient disclosures regarding the de-
fendant company’s adoption of new accounting principles.140 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s statements about its
revenue and operating margin growth were rendered misleading be-
cause defendants failed to adequately disclose the full impact of the
Company’s early adoption of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14,141 which
caused investors to think that reported earnings were higher than they
actually were.142 The plaintiffs further alleged that “by transitioning to
the new rules [ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14], companies would be
able to recognize revenue earlier than they could under the old
rules”143 creating what appeared to be a revenue boost.144
The court ultimately determined that plaintiffs failed to plead
sufficient facts to show that defendant’s disclosures were materially
scope of SOP 97-2, multiple elements might include specified or unspecified upgrade
rights, in addition to the software product and the hosting service.”).
137. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 1.
138. Id. at 2 (“Since the lack of such evidence for undelivered items often prevents
companies from recognizing revenue from undelivered elements, the use of estimated
prices instead may permit many more elements to be recognized and potentially accelerat-
ing revenue recognition for delivered items.”).
139. City of Royal Oak Ret. Sys., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1045.
140. Id. at 1055–56.
141. See id. at 1065.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1054.
144. Id. at 1055.
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misleading statements under federal securities laws.145 Further, the
court determined that the defendants made adequate disclosures of
the new accounting practices by fully disclosing exactly how much
larger its reported revenues were under the new accounting practices
in its filings with the SEC.146
However, several factors distinguish investors at large from the
plaintiffs in this case. First, the defendants spoke directly to the plain-
tiffs in conference calls and identified their statements as “forward-
looking” and accompanied such statements with cautionary language
and explained “actual results could vary.”147 The typical investor par-
ticipating in a public stock exchange would not have the luxury of
participating in conference calls with a company to have the company
contextualize the written opinions and statements contained in its an-
nual financial report. Second, unlike in the Royal Oak case where the
court described the defendant’s forecasts as “vague, generalized asser-
tions of corporate optimism or statements of mere puffing,”148 state-
ments contained in an annual financial report are not generally taken
to be assertions of corporate optimism. Instead, a reasonable investor
would rely on the assertions contained in an annual financial report.
Lastly, unlike in the Royal Oak case, annual financial reports such as
balance sheets are not forward-looking. Instead, they are backward-
looking in that they describe a company’s current financial posi-
tion,149 based on what occurred in the immediate past. Consequently,
investors rely on annual financial reports to be a clear and accurate
portrayal of the company’s financial health.150
Further, disclosures in SEC filings are arguably inadequate, as it is
common knowledge that companies typically include such disclosures
in SEC filings that are hundreds of pages long.151 Additionally, such
145. Id. at 1067.
146. Id. at 1065–66.
147. Id. at 1062.
148. Id. at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (9th ed. 2009) (defining balance sheet as “[a] state-
ment of an entity’s current financial position, disclosing the value of the entity’s assets,
liabilities, and owners’ equity.”).
150. See The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
151. The buried fact doctrine applies when the fact in question is hidden in a volumi-
nous document or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion that prevents a reasonable share-
holder from realizing the “correlation and overall import of the various facts interspersed
throughout . . .” the document. Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); see SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV-09-3994-JFW (MANx), 2010 WL 3656068, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (“[A] reasonable investor is not required to pore through all prior transcripts of
earnings calls, review hundreds of prospectus supplements filed by indirect subsidiaries, or
‘connect the dots’ in a company’s various SEC filings.”).
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disclosures are typically in fine print or in a footnote that refers to
another footnote or another document entirely. All of these facts
would make it difficult for investors to actually comprehend or even
notice the disclosures.
Therefore, the release of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 broad-
ens the scope of the problems originally presented by SOP 97-2. Com-
panies are able to recognize revenue earlier than they could under
both traditional rules and SOP 97-2. This creates what investors may
perceive to be a revenue boost. This problem is not resolved when a
company fully discloses its adoption of the accounting practices in its
SEC filings for the reasons stated previously.
B. Effects on Shares
Revenue recognition policies are complicated by multiple-ele-
ment arrangements that provide for multiple-software deliverables.
These arrangements force companies to employ complicated and
costly methods, such as VSOE analysis, to determine how to allocate a
single fee for both products delivered in the present and services de-
livered in the future.152 Knowing when to recognize revenue is espe-
cially difficult since the time at which future services are performed is
generally unpredictable and, depending on the product or service,
can expand years into the future.153 Recall the previous example
figures in Part II.A. If a software company such as Verizon sold multi-
ple deliverables that included a cell phone with future upgrades and a
warranty for the repair of any software malfunctions, then Verizon tra-
ditionally could not recognize the revenue for all of those deliverables
at the time of shipment because this would violate the matching prin-
ciple. However, under SOP 97-2 a company could recognize the reve-
nue from a bundled sale upfront only if the cost of the subsequent
expenses is known, or more formally, if VSOE substantiates the cost
for each product.154
But now, under ASU 2009-14, if we assume that the software that
comes with the phone is essential to its functionality (the phone could
not operate without the software and the company infrequently sells
the hardware without the software), then ASU 2009-13 applies.155 Ac-
152. Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38.
153. See Craig Schneider, The Deferred Revenue Dilemma, CFO (Feb. 14, 2005), http://
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3661631/c_2984382.
154. See Petra & Slavin, supra note 65, at 38.
155. See Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 1; Nefdt & Dillard, supra note 83, at 3
(“If software in a tangible product is essential to its functionality, the entire product, in-
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cordingly, the company may rely on ESP, which is a more flexible stan-
dard than both TPE and VSOE.156 ESP can be applied to undelivered
elements in an arrangement and permits acceleration of revenue rec-
ognition for items delivered.157
In terms of its effect on the prices of shares of stock, accelerated
revenue recognition can be superficially beneficial to software compa-
nies because recognizing all of their revenue up front allows them to
appear to shareholders as if they are flourishing.158 This effect is only
helpful if their reports of increased revenue are in fact accurate.159
However, if a company cannot accurately gauge the scope or depth of
their future expenses, then financial reports are more likely to be in-
accurate and overstate their net revenue.
Inaccurate reporting is potentially devastating to shareholders
and companies because those who invest in companies on the false
belief that the company is flourishing are at serious risk of losing their
investments later. When investors become aware that a company has
overstated its growth, they are likely to remove their equity from the
company’s books—by selling their shares of stock—to avoid any fu-
ture dealings with that company.160
cluding the software, is outside the scope of [SOP 97-2] and is instead within the scope of
[ASU 2009-13].”).
156. See Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 3.
157. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 2 (“Since the lack of such evidence for
undelivered items often prevents companies from recognizing revenue from undelivered
elements, the use of estimated prices instead may permit many more elements to be recog-
nized and potentially accelerating revenue recognition for delivered items.”).
158. See Jennifer Altamuro et al., The Effects of Accelerated Revenue Recognition on Earnings
Management and Earnings Informativeness: Evidence from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101,
80 ACCT. REV. 373, 399 (2005) (“[T]he revenue recognition practices targeted by SAB No.
101[, using accelerated revenue recognition,] have been used by some firms to manage
earnings . . . .”); Lorraine Magrath & Leonard G. Weld, Abusive Earnings Management and
Early Warning Signs, 72 CPA J. 50, 51 (2002), available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajour
nal/2002/0802/features/f085002.htm (“Earnings management practices can be designed
either to assist managers in fulfilling their obligations to stakeholders or to deceive inves-
tors. . . . [C]orporate managers . . . let the desire to meet earnings expectations override
good business practices.”).
159. If the reports of increased revenue are inaccurate, companies can be harmed by
their later efforts to make up the reported but unearned revenue. See Magrath & Weld,
supra note 162, at 53 (“The seemingly common consequence of improper revenue recogni-
tion practices is that, once started, companies must continue earnings management activi-
ties in order to meet ever-increasing internal sales targets and analysts’ expectations. . . .
Eventually, companies must engage in more blatant fraudulent activities . . . to perpetuate
myths involving company ‘growth.’”).
160. See id. at 51 (“Regardless of fault, when earnings management and fraudulent
accounting schemes are uncovered, the monetary losses can be staggering. Enron’s stock
fell from its high of $90.75 to $0.68 after the SEC began investigating Enron’s accounting
practices. After the collapse in the market value of its stock, Enron was forced to seek
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Often, changes in earnings are due to inaccurate financial report-
ing by companies that abuse or misapply SOP 97-2.161 Additionally,
the mere nature of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 may lead to techni-
cally legal financial reporting that nevertheless misstates a company’s
earnings.162 In the past, once the SEC has become aware of this misre-
porting, companies have been forced to restate their financials.163
When a company restates its financials investors will likely become
bearish164 about that company’s securities and may question the verac-
ity of any earnings it reports in the future.165 Thus, firms should avoid
practices that increase the likelihood of a restatement.
C. Restatements
As previously stated, financial report restatements are ordered by
the SEC when companies inaccurately report their financial status.
When the SEC released Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 (“SAB 101”) on
December 3, 1999, the stock of many companies took a deep dive be-
cause it compelled many firms to restate their revenue downward,
bankruptcy protection, resulting in the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. A recent Finan-
cial Executives International (FEI) report indicates that the stock market lost more than
$34 billion during the three-day period during which the three most egregious cases of
abusive earnings management in 2000 (Lucent Technologies, Cendant, and MicroS-
trategy) surfaced.”).
161. See e.g., Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 256–58 (5th Cir. 2005) (inves-
tor-plaintiffs arguing that defendant’s supposedly strong financial statements were the re-
sult of recognizing revenue on sales of its software products in violation of U.S. GAAP and
AICPA’s SOP 97-2); Regan & Regan, supra note 72, at 51 (“Such was the case with Tokyo-
based NEC Corp. The information technology, mobile and electronic device company an-
nounced in September that it was unable to complete the analysis necessary under SOP 97-
2 to provide vendor specific objective evidence (VSOE) to support recognition of revenue
from certain types of software and maintenance and support services provided as part of
multiple-element contracts.”); Alix Stuart, Why VSOE Spells Trouble, CFO (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/10328463/c_10346944 (“With sincere apolo-
gies to investors everywhere, NEC said its financial statements from 2000 to 2006 were now
unreliable, and that it would accept delisting in New York.”).
162. See e.g., City of Royal Oak Ret. Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1045
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that defendant provided sufficient disclosures to investors
when defendant stated that “[a]s a result of the adoption of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-
14, net revenues for the three and six months ended in June 20, 2010, were approximately
$53 million and $78 million higher than the net revenues that would have been recorded
under the previous accounting rules”).
163. See infra Part III.C.
164. An investor is bearish if he or she “believes that a particular security or market is
headed downward. . . . Bears are generally pessimistic about the state of a given market.”
Bear Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bear.asp (last visited
Apr. 23, 2014).
165. See Huong N. Higgins, Managing Financial Reporting Risks Under SAB 101, RISK
MGMT., Aug. 2001, at 41, 41.
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which encouraged investors to sell their stock.166 According to a secur-
ities lawsuit database at Stanford University,167 subsequent to SAB 101,
revenue overstatement cases and securities class actions occurred
more often than in previous years.168 Being ordered to restate a finan-
cial report can be financially damaging to a company because it causes
investors to lose faith in the financial health of a company.169 Al-
though incorrect financial reporting does not necessarily indicate
fraud—it could simply mean that a company employed the wrong ac-
counting principle—once a company loses face or exposes itself to the
monetary risks that accompany securities fraud litigation, it can be
very difficult to recover. The following chart170 details the restatement
trend from 2001–2007:
166. Id.
167. Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/
(last visited June 3, 2014).
168. Higgins, supra note 169, at 42.
169. See Fred H.M. Gertsen et al., Avoiding Reputation Damage in Financial Restatements,
39 LONG RANGE PLAN. 429, 429 (2006), available at http://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/default/
content/rsm2/attachments/pdf1/avoiding%20reputation%20demage (“The incidence of
companies restating their financial results has recently been increasing steadily each year.
This has resulted in the public trust in large companies being eroded, and in some cases,
most notably Enron, the restatement has triggered the company’s downfall.”); Magrath &
Weld, supra note 162, at 51 (“Enron’s stock fell from its high of $90.75 to $0.68 after the
SEC began investigating Enron’s accounting practices.”).
170. Angus Robertson, U.S. Company Financial Statements Down Sharply in 2007, RE-
SEARCH RECAP (Mar. 03, 2008), http://www.alacrastore.com/blog/us-company-financial-re
statements-down-sharply-in-2007/.
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As illustrated, the need for restatements grew tremendously from
2001 through 2006. According to Audit Analytics,171 this result is pri-
marily due to misstated debt, expense recording, revenue recognition,
and classification errors.172
Software companies’ restatement rate grew from 18 in 1997 to 74
in 1999.173 Although this number went back down to 66 in 2000, it was
still up from its 1997 rate.174 See the figure175 below:
The numbers in the figure reveal the impact of SOP 97-2. The
figure indicates that immediately after SOP 97-2 was passed, software
companies began increasingly misreporting their earnings, which re-
sulted in their having to later restate their earnings.
ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 may also be contributing to an
increase in restatements. In 2010, the year that the new rules were to
take effect,176 restatements increased by 8 percent despite having de-
creased over the previous three years.177 And in 2011, restatements
171. “Audit Analytics is an innovative on-line public company intelligence service avail-
able from the Ives Group Inc., a leading independent research provider focused on the
accounting, insurance, regulatory, legal and investment communities.” About, AUDIT ANA-
LYTICS, http://www.auditanalytics.com/0000/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
172. Robertson, supra note 175.
173. Michael C. Sullivan & Darrin K. Wald, Financial Reporting Restatements: What Are the
Causes and Warning Sings?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2002, at 12, 39.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 2 (“ASU 2009-14 will be effective for
fiscal years beginning June 15th 2010 and early adoption is possible.”).
177. Tammy Whitehouse, After 3 Years of Decline, Restatements Turn Up in 2010, COMPLI-
ANCE WEEK (May 11, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/after-3-years-of-decline-re
statements-turn-up-in-2010/article/202518/.
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remained about 8 percent higher than 2009 levels, which includes in-
creases over 2010 levels for companies listed on the NYSE.178
The previous figure and statistics only reveal the misreporting
that was discovered. However, more may go unnoticed. The increase
in restatements may indicate that software companies took SOP 97-2
and then ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 as licenses to inflate their
earnings by recognizing all of their revenue upfront. However, some
of the restatements may be due, in part, to genuine confusion about
when and how to apply these rules. Financial misreporting under-
mines the very purpose of the SEC, which is to protect the integrity of
the securities market.
IV. The Role of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
Section 10(b) of the Act is designed to protect investors from se-
curities fraud.179 Such fraud may be perpetrated by the managers of
publicly-owned corporations.180 Section 10(b) regulates securities
fraud by stating, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange. . . . (b)
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.181
Rule 10b-5,182 issued by the SEC under section 10(b), was imple-
mented to protect the integrity of the securities market by prohibiting
fraud or misreporting.183 Rule 10b-5 specifically regulates the use of
“manipulative and deceptive devices.”184 “[T]he overriding purpose of
178. Tammy Whitehouse, Restatements Steady in 2011, but NYSE Sees Rise, COMPLIANCE
WEEK (June 7, 2012), http://www.complianceweek.com/restatements-steady-in-2011-but-
nyse-sees-rise/article/244814/.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012); The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
180. E.g., Francine McKenna, Hewlett-Packard’s Autonomy Allegations: A Material
Writedown Puts All Four Audit Firms on the Spot, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/francinemckenna/2012/11/20/hewlett-packards-autonomy-allegations-a-mate
rial-writedown-puts-all-four-audit-firms-on-the-spot/ (“[F]ormer members of Autonomy’s
management team inflated Autonomy’s underlying financial metrics—GAAP and non-
GAAP.”).
181. Id.
182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78b; The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
184. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was to protect the purity of the securi-
ties market . . . .”185 The purity of the securities market depends on
the availability of accurate information about publicly-traded compa-
nies. The income statement is an example of a tool that investors use
to gain information about companies.
A company’s income statement is a device used to in essence all
of the revenues, expenses, gains and losses that a business incurred
during a given period.186 Investors rely on financial statements such as
the income statement to provide an accurate and transparent por-
trayal of the company’s financial position.187 The information found
on these statements can be the deciding factor for determining
whether or not investors purchase debt or equity securities in a com-
pany. A company with high revenue is viewed as financially strong and
therefore more likely to attract investors because the investors believe
that the company can provide them with a high return on their invest-
ment. Investors will form an opposite opinion about a company with
low revenue. Thus, an income statement is a very powerful device be-
cause it can literally make or break a company in the eyes of investors.
As a result, corporate officers have a strong incentive to attract inves-
tors by using their financial statements to make their company look as
strong as possible. Unfortunately, such pressures may encourage cor-
porate officers to inflate their actual earnings,188 which is a clear viola-
tion of rule 10b-5 since it involves employing manipulative devices to
influence the purchase or sale of a security.
For example, in 2011 Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) paid $11.1 billion
for Autonomy, a software firm based in the United Kingdom.189 How-
ever, on November 20, 2012, HP revealed that it had to write down $5
billion of the acquisition price because of “serious accounting impro-
prieties, misrepresentation and disclosure failures.”190 The announce-
ment caused a one-day drop in stock price of “12 percent to a 10-year
low of $11.71.”191 HP alleged that Autonomy willfully inflated revenue
185. Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 532–33 (9th Cir.
1976).
186. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (9th Ed. 2009) (defining income statement as “[a]
statement of all the revenues, expenses, gains, and losses that a business incurred during a
given period”).
187. See The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
188. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 185.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Poornima Gupta & Nicola Leske, HP Accuses Autonomy of Wrongdoing, Takes $8.8
Billion Charge, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/uk-
hp-results-idUKBRE8AJ0OD20121121.
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on its financial statements to mislead potential investors and buy-
ers.192 According to HP, Autonomy was selling some of its hardware
products at a loss but booked the hardware sales as high-margin
software sales. 193 This example evidences the type of power that fi-
nancial reporting and accounting practices have over investment deci-
sions—even those made by sophisticated companies.
Securities fraud is further made possible by auditing firms who do
not closely screen the financial statements of the firms they are audit-
ing. For example, HP relied on one of the most reputable auditing
firms in the industry, Deloitte LLP, to help it perform its due dili-
gence during the acquisition process.194 Despite its efforts, Deloitte
did not detect the material misstatements on Autonomy’s
financials.195 HP chose Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP to help it in-
vestigate the claims of a senior member of Autonomy’s leadership
team who blew the proverbial whistle by revealing “there had been a
series of questionable accounting and business practices prior to the
acquisition by HP.”196 Ernst & Young also signed off on the deal at the
end of 2011 as HP’s auditor.197 HP also hired auditing firm KPMG to
audit Deloitte’s work during the acquisition process.198 Despite review
by two of the so-called “Big Four,” or the four most reputable auditing
firms in the financial industry,199 Autonomy’s alleged fraud went
unnoticed.200
The harm caused by Autonomy is a direct result of financial mis-
reporting in financial statements. SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU
2009-14 pose the same or similar harm because they make financial
misreporting more likely. Thus, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 should
effectively function as a system of checks and balances against the type
of securities fraud and/or deception that can be perpetuated through
complex financial reporting and accounting practices like SOP 97-2,
ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; Prestige, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/company-rankings/accounting/most-
prestigious-accounting-firms (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (“Accounting professionals across
the nation rank the prestige of the firms they compete against.”).
195. See McKenna, supra note 185.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
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V. SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 Directly
Conflict with the Purpose of Section 10(b)
SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 allow software compa-
nies to use their financial statements as manipulative devices in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities because these rules
allow software companies to report revenue they have not earned.201
By reporting unearned revenue to potential investors, software com-
panies are able to artificially inflate their financial statements. Once
enhanced by unearned revenue, financial statements indirectly be-
come manipulative devices.
Equity investors who invest in publicly traded corporations heav-
ily rely on reported financials to make investment decisions 202 and
are drawn to high risk-adjusted returns or earnings figures. Specifi-
cally, equity investors want high returns in relation to the risk associ-
ated with their investments. This is evidenced by the mere fact that
equity investors are investing their money in corporations rather than
placing their money in a savings account or purchasing a certificate of
deposit, both of which also offer financial returns but have lower risk
and significantly lower returns. By making equity investments, inves-
tors assume higher risk in exchange for the potential to receive higher
returns or earnings.203 Thus, equity investors sign up to assume some
risk but such risk must make sense in light of the returns anticipated.
Financial statements help equity investors determine whether an
equity investment makes sense because they provide a snapshot of the
health of a company at the time of reporting or its recent revenue. So
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would con-
sider accurate financial statements important in deciding how to in-
vest their money. It is easy to see how financial statements can be
201. See supra Part III.B.
202. See The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14 (“The laws and rules that govern the secur-
ities industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all
investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain
basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other infor-
mation to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to
judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through the
steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions.”).
203. Risk-Return Tradeoff Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/riskreturntradeoff.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2014) (“The principle that potential
return rises with an increase in risk. Low levels of uncertainty (low-risk) are associated with
low potential returns, whereas high levels of uncertainty (high-risk) are associated with
high potential returns.”).
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directly employed by software companies as manipulative devices used
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in violation of
rule 10b-5.
Initially, SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 may seem like
a perfectly appropriate way to account for bundled or multiple-ele-
ment products and services. However, in practice these rules function
as an accounting loophole that is subject to widespread abuse. Such
abuse may rise to the level of direct forms of securities fraud. Section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 appear to be more effective in regulating direct
forms of securities fraud such as insider trading, short-selling abuses,
mutual fund frauds, or Ponzi schemes. However, more indirect forms
of securities fraud such as financial misreporting may escape the grip
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and
ASU 2009-14, all promote lenient revenue recognition practices. As
these rules stand now, companies may legally inflate their earnings by
recognizing unearned revenue upfront.
Consequently, SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 directly
conflict with an important purpose of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
which is to prevent the direct or indirect use of any means or instru-
mentality to employ any manipulative device or contrivance in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered or not
registered, for the protection of investors.204
VI. Recommendations
The purpose of rule 10b-5 is to prevent investor fraud and reduce
improprieties in the securities market.205 While the purpose of ASU
2009-13 and ASU 2009-14 is to narrow the scope of SOP 97-2,206 and
the purpose of SOP 97-2 is to provide clarity about how to recognize
revenue in multiple-element transactions, these rules have the inci-
dental effect of undermining rule 10b-5.
The combination of earnings management techniques and the
pressure imposed by Wall Street on managers to report high earnings
makes it difficult for managers to avoid misstating earnings or pad-
ding expected earnings to compensate for inadequacies in sales.207
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
206. Debrief on ASU 2009-14, supra note 4, at 3.
207. Robert M. Bowen et al., Determinants of Revenue-reporting Practices for Internet Firms,
19 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 523, 525–26 (2002) (“[F]inancial press commentary, regulatory
concerns, and empirical evidence suggest that managers of Internet firms have economic
incentives to report relatively high levels of revenue. Incentives to influence stock prices
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“Accounting systems are crucial to valuation.”208 Therefore, to help
avoid misstatements, adoption of one of the following is proposed: (1)
Software companies that choose to bundle their transactions must de-
fer revenue for the entire transaction if revenue for one of the ele-
ments of the bundle has not been earned, or (2) software companies
must wait three quarterly periods before they can recognize revenue
from bundled transactions if the income for one or more of the ele-
ments had not been earned yet.
A. Proposal 1: The Defer-All Rule
Under this approach, software companies that choose to bundle
their transactions would be required to defer revenue for the entire
transaction if revenue for one of the elements of the bundle has not
been earned. This rule would be the exact opposite of SOP 97-2, ASU
2009-13, and ASU 2009-14, which allow upfront recognition. In the
case of ASU 2009-13 and ASU 2009-14, through the application of the
ESP measure accounting managers may do little more than guess at
the price of the undelivered elements.209 For example, assume a pack-
age includes computer software, a computer system, and a software
upgrade. Assume the customer will redeem the upgrade in the future.
At the time of sale, Company A earned the revenue for the software
and the computer system because it delivered these items to the cus-
tomer. Here, the cost of the transaction has already been factored in.
However, the revenue for the software upgrade is not accurate be-
cause the cost of the upgrade has not been accounted for. Thus,
under this rule, Company A would defer revenue from the entire bun-
dle until it has incurred the cost associated with the revenue for the
software upgrade (i.e. Company A gives the customer the software
upgrade).
Companies that benefit from reporting their income upfront or
at the time of sale are likely to oppose this defer-all rule because by
are important because Internet firms often; a) expect to raise additional equity capital; b)
use their stock to acquire other companies; and c) rely on stock based compensation to
hire and retain key employees. Internet managers also likely have incentives to influence
other parties (e.g., capital providers other than stock market investors, suppliers, and cus-
tomers) by reporting higher revenue.”) (citation omitted); see generally Magrath & Weld,
supra note 162, at 51–52 (“[C]orporate managers . . . let their desire to meet earnings
expectations override good business practice. . . . Companies have long used earnings man-
agement techniques to ‘smooth’ earnings, a process that is typically rewarded in the stock
market.”).
208. See Charles M.C. Lee, Accounting-Based Valuation: Impact on Business Practices and
Research, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 413, 414 (1999).
209. See supra Part II.C.
Winter 2014] REVENUE RECOGNITION RULES 617
deferring recognition of their earnings until a later date, their finan-
cial statements look less attractive to potential investors. This proposal
imposes very conservative reporting standards on bundled transac-
tions by prohibiting Company A from estimating the selling price
and/or recognizing any earnings until all items have been delivered.
But if an item or service has not been delivered then the true revenue
from the transaction has not been earned, because the cost has not
been factored in. Conservative reporting standards are more likely to
protect investors and keep the securities market pure and honest by
requiring more accurate reporting of revenue that accounts for the
cost of the transaction. Unlike SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-
14, this method does not permit a company to legally inflate its earn-
ings by recognizing unearned revenue upfront.
B. Proposal 2: The Three-Period Rule
Under this rule, software companies that bundle multiple-ele-
ments into one transaction would be required to wait three financial
reporting periods210 before recognizing the revenue of the entire
bundled transaction. This rule would only apply if revenue for one or
more of the elements in the transaction has not been earned (e.g.,
delivered). For example, if Company A sold the same bundled trans-
action (the computer system, software, and future upgrade) to a cus-
tomer, then Company A must either wait until (1) all elements of the
bundle have been delivered, or (2) three financial reporting periods
have passed, whichever occurs sooner. Unlike SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13,
and ASU 2009-14, this method does not allow a company to automati-
cally recognize revenue simply because it bundled delivered items
with non-delivered items. Nine months is a safe waiting period be-
cause it gives software companies a conservative amount of time to
actually incur the expense. For example, given the ever-changing na-
ture of the technology industry, Company A’s customer is likely to
redeem the software upgrade within nine months, if at all.211 Since
210. Financial reports are submitted on a quarterly basis so three financial reporting
periods is equivalent to nine (9) months. Quarter (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quarter.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
211. See e.g., David Smith, iOS Version Stats, DAVID SMITH BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:01 PM),
http://david-smith.org/iosversionstats/ (showing that the percentage of Apple device
users that upgraded their mobile platform to the latest version of iOS remained steady
after approximately six weeks); David Smith, iOS 5.1 Upgrade Stats, DAVID SMITH BLOG (Mar.
10, 2012), http://david-smith.org/blog/2012/03/10/ios-5-dot-1-upgrade-stats/ (showing
that the percentage of Apple device users that upgraded their mobile platform to iOS 5.1
remained steady over one month).
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technology is constantly being updated and improved, a customer
who wants the benefit of the upgrade is not likely to wait over nine
months to claim this benefit. Therefore, the three-period rule is a re-
spectable amount of time to impose on software companies.
Software companies will likely argue that three periods is entirely
too long for a company to wait to report revenue because it weakens
their financial statements and prevents them from reporting revenue
from any non-software items they may have sold. However, if software
companies like Company A do not want to be subjected to these pro-
posed rules then they could always unbundle their transactions, where
practicable, and sell each item separately.
This method would eliminate the practice under ASU 2009-13
and ASU 2009-14 of estimating the selling price upfront. Instead, com-
panies wishing to apply SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, or ASU 2009-14 would
need to wait at least three financial periods before they applied ESP
measures to undelivered elements in a bundled transaction.
This method also reduces the risk of misrepresentation because a
company that waits three periods to recognize revenue is less likely to
need to employ the lenient ESP measures since such companies are
more likely to have incurred the expense or delivered any remaining
item or items. As a result, such companies could recognize the reve-
nue from the software and the computer upfront but would have to
defer recognition of the software upgrade.
While this suggestion does not give software companies the bene-
fit of bundling transactions, it does allow them to recognize immedi-
ately at least some of their earnings. Such practice would protect
investors because it only allows companies to recognize revenue that
they have actually earned or are very likely to have earned, which
reduces the possibility of legally reporting inflated or estimated earn-
ings, a concern that outweighs any inconveniences to software
companies.
Conclusion
Software companies are in a unique position in that they have the
ability to create highly specialized and highly valued products.
Software companies also enjoy the benefit of SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13,
and ASU 2009-14, which allows them to report revenue from bundled
software sales upfront. However, products and services offered by
software companies tend to involve a complex mix of items that can
be delivered in the present and items that cannot be delivered until
some time in the future. Such complexities complicate financial re-
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porting practices and require software companies to spend a lot of
money to make sure its reporting practices comply with GAAP. Such
complexities create a risk of securities fraud in that they enable a
software company to use one or more of its financial statements as a
manipulative device or contrivance by inflating the company’s actual
earnings. Thus, as previously argued, SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and
ASU 2009-14, should be eliminated and replaced with either: (1) the
defer-all rule or (2) the three-period rule to reduce the risk of fraud
by restoring the tradition of conservative financial reporting and
accounting.
SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14 are not necessary loop-
holes for software companies—especially since the loopholes are at
the expense of the public. Although the elimination of these rules
may inconvenience software companies, this inconvenience is out-
weighed by the increased accuracy and transparency that would result
from the elimination of these rules. A securities regulatory regime
that favors accuracy and transparency in financial reporting, the pur-
pose of which is to protect investors from securities fraud and uphold
the integrity of the securities market,212 requires the elimination of
policies like SOP 97-2, ASU 2009-13, and ASU 2009-14.
Ultimately by focusing on creating distinguished technology, re-
porting accurately, and by giving less focus to creating the illusion of
high revenues, software firms can gain invaluable social capital and
trust from investors. However, to do this software firms must realize
that accounting and valuation practice is as much an art as it is a
science.213
212. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012); The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 14.
213. Lee, supra note 208.
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